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In his seminal 1971 essay Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, 
Harry Frankfurt provides an insightful account of free will and the prob-
lem of determinism, that is not metaphysical, but rather psychological 
and practical. First and foremost, though, Frankfurt offers a philosophical 
analysis of the nature of personhood. He does so by providing an alterna-
tive to the account of personhood advanced by Peter Strawson. In the 
Strawsonian view, a person is defined exclusively as a subject having both 
physical and mental properties, so that the concept of a person can simply 
be equated with the concept of a human being. Frankfurt argues against 
this view, assuming that mere membership in the biological species homo 
sapiens is not sufficient enough to decide on the question of personhood. 
Instead, he claims that the essence of a person is to be found in the struc-
ture of the will.
According to his analysis we as human beings can be persons, because 
we do not only have first-order desires, but also possess the capacity to 
form second-order (and other higher-order) desires. As Frankfurt puts 
it, ‘besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, 
men may also want to have (or not to have) certain desires and motives’ 
(1971, p. 7, emphasis in original). Consider, for example, Sharon, an 
occasional smoker of medical marijuana who, although she genuinely 
enjoys the feeling of being alive that occurs with the inhalation of the 
cannabis smoke (which can be understood as a first-order desire), is con-
vinced that she could be a better mother for her children if she were to 
break the habit. By having second-order desires (in the example, Sha-
ron’s wanting not to desire to smoke medical marijuana) we are able to 
step back for a moment from our motivations and make those moti-
vations the objects of reflection. However, this ‘capacity for reflective 
self-evaluation’ (ibid.), as Frankfurt calls it, is in itself necessary but not 
sufficient for human personhood. In fact, it is the capacity for reflec-
tive self-evaluation that distinguishes human beings from the rest of 
the animal kingdom. Frankfurt argues that, in order to be considered 
a person, an individual should not only have second-order desires in 
general, but also specifically, desires to have certain desires to be his will. 
In Frankfurt’s terminology, such ‘second-order volitions’ are that sub-
set of second-order desires, which are directly concerned with which of 
our first-order desires should be effective in moving us into action. Sup-
pose that Sharon now has become addicted. Although, as a consequence 
of her addiction, she has a competing second-order desire to continue 
desiring to smoke marijuana, she also still wants to refrain from desiring 
it. So instead of succumbing to her addiction, she decides to enter a drug 
rehabilitation program. In this case, Sharon’s second-order desire not 
to desire to smoke marijuana constitutes a second-order volition, since 
it is effective in making the first-order desire to not smoke marijuana 
her will. A creature which is capable of having second order desires but 
unable to form volitions of the second order, is labelled by Frankfurt 
a ‘wanton’: someone whom we cannot regard as a person. A wanton is 
someone who is not ‘concerned with whether the desires which move 
him to act are desires by which he wants to be moved to act’ (Frank-
furt, 1971, p. 12). That is to say, a wanton is indifferent with regard 
to which first-order desires constitute his will.1 Examples of wantons 
include very young children (Frankfurt, 1971, p. 11), but also, though 
not explicitly mentioned by Frankfurt, old people with dementia and 
the severely mentally disabled, all of whom could be said to be incapa-
ble of assuming a higher-order attitude toward their desires.  
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At first glance, Frankfurt’s hierarchical concept of a person seems intu-
itively attractive, allowing for inner conflicts, for complex motivational 
structures, but most importantly, for the idea that personhood consists 
in the ‘default’ (Frankfurt, 2006, p. 173) condition of ‘being identified 
with the content of one’s own mind’ (ibid.) by the willing acceptance of 
our motivational attitudes.2 Despite its apparent attractiveness, Frankfurt’s 
hierarchical theory faces two major problems, however. First, the notion 
of ‘hierarchy’ is not merely descriptive, but also normative: a second-order 
desire (or volition) is not only ‘higher’ than a first-order desire by hav-
ing it as its intentional object, but also ‘higher’ in the sense of having 
more authority. Frankfurt’s hierarchical model seems to fail to explain 
this purported special ‘status’, thereby endowing higher-order desires and 
volitions with greater authority for no reason but ‘glaring favouritism 
with respect to the higher parts of the soul’ (Stoecker, 2015, p. 104).3 
Second, as Gary Watson points out in Free Agency (1975), Frankfurt’s 
hierarchical theory is vulnerable to the problem of infinite regress. After 
all, if we need second-order desires (and volitions) concerning what first-
order desires we want, in order to be considered persons, why not also 
have third-order desires about second desires, fourth-order desires about 
third-order desires, and …, ad infinitum? Or, put differently, if there is 
an unresolved conflict among our second-order desires, how then can we 
avoid descending into wantonness without our second-order desires being 
endorsed by even higher-order desires? Frankfurt attempts to solve the 
problem of progressive ascent to hierarchically yet-higher-order desires by 
introducing new ideas into his theory, including decisive commitment, 
identification, wholeheartedness and satisfaction. However, it remains 
questionable whether and to what extent he has succeeded in his attempt. 
In this essay I shall argue, contra Frankfurt, that his notion of identifi-
cation is too strong and that of satisfaction too weak to serve as criteria for 
personhood, and that this – at least, in the case of satisfaction – should be 
conceived as such even from within the context of Frankfurt’s own philo-
sophical oeuvre. Before offering such an argument, however, I will first 
discuss how Frankfurt advanced these notions as a means to overcome the 
problem of infinite regress. After that, I will demonstrate how both attempts 
– albeit successful in terms of solving the regressus ad infinitum prob-
lem – fail to establish sufficient grounds for human personhood.  
§1 Identification
We wanted to know what prevents wantonness with regard to one’s 
higher-order volitions. What gives these volitions any special relation 
to ‘oneself ’? It is unhelpful to answer that one makes a ‘decisive 
commitment,’ where this just means that an interminable ascent to 
higher orders is not going to be permitted. This is arbitrary. (Watson, 
1975, p. 218; emphasis in original)
In Identification and Wholeheartedness (1988b) Frankfurt responds to 
Watson’s criticism by acknowledging that his earlier account of ‘decisive 
commitment’, in which a person decisively identifies himself with one of 
his first-order desires, is indeed flawed, by being ‘terribly obscure’ (1988b, 
p. 167) and unable to explain how such termination of the regress to 
increasingly higher-order desires is, in fact, not arbitrary. As a result of 
his ‘unfortunate and confusing choice of words’,4 decisive commitment 
might seem to consist merely in ‘an arbitrary refusal to permit an intermi-
nable ascent to higher orders’ (ibid.), but this does not mean, according to 
Frankfurt, that it actually does. Frankfurt therefore concludes that it is not 
himself but Watson who is in error. 
To demonstrate how ‘the potentially endless sequence of evaluations 
[of increasingly higher order]’ (1988b, p. 169) can be terminated with-
out arbitrariness, Frankfurt introduces the concept of ‘identification’. By 
relying upon an analogy between identification and arithmetic, Frank-
furt argues that terminating the sequence at a point at which there is 
no disturbing (or possible) conflict or doubt, is not arbitrary: although 
it is possible – in the case of arithmetic – for a person to perform yet 
another calculation (and continue the sequence of possible further calcula-
tions) in order to confirm the result of the initial calculation, Frankfurt 
explains, such behavior would ultimately prove to be futile, given that 
there is no conflict, ‘either between results already obtained or between 
a result already obtained and one [that might be reasonably expected to 
be obtained] if the sequence were to continue’ (ibid.). For Frankfurt, the 
cut-off point (at which the sequence is terminated) is a point of decision 
(because, etymologically, the verb ‘to decide’ means ‘to cut-off’), at which 
a person actively decides to terminate the sequence of evaluation: 
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The decision determines what the person really wants by making a desire 
on which he decides fully his own. To this extent the person, in making a 
decision with which he identifies, constitutes himself. The pertinent desire 
is no longer in any way external to him. (…) It comes to be a desire that 
is incorporated into him by virtue of the fact that he has it by his own 
will. (1988b, p. 170; emphasis in original)
At first glance, Frankfurt’s notion of identification appears to be nothing 
more than a rephrasing (or annotated version) of his account of decisive 
commitment. However, the authority (possessed by a particular second-
order volition) does not consist any longer in merely identifying with the 
desire, but rather in having also decisive reasons for the act of identifica-
tion.  
Identification is the decisive act of ‘putting a particular second-order 
volition in charge’ (Bransen, 1996, p. 5), endowing it with authority or pri-
ority with respect to the desires that are its object: by volitionally endorsing 
desires that are ‘legitimate candidate[s] of satisfaction’ (Frankfurt, 1988b, p. 
170), after having reflected upon their desirability, and rejecting unwanted 
desires (‘[those having entitlement] to no priority whatsoever’, ibid.), an 
individual constitutes himself as a person. By doing so, Frankfurt empha-
sizes again, a person distinguishes himself from a wanton by replacing ‘the 
liberty of anarchic impulsive behavior with the autonomy of being under 
his own control’ (1988b, p. 175, emphasis added). In other words, a person 
makes up his mind instead of ‘doing what comes naturally [to him]’ (ibid.), 
that is, figuratively speaking, ‘going wherever the wind takes him’. 
In the following section I will defend my claim that iden-
tification is too strong to serve as a criterion for personhood.  
§1.1 Obsessive Self-Control
By emphasizing such a strong exercise of self-control, Frankfurt’s concept of 
identification is at risk of jeopardizing personhood rather than protecting 
it (Wagner, 2011, p. 38). According to Marya Schechtman, we intuitively 
consider ‘overly rigid self-control [as being] an impediment to being one-
self ’ (2005, p. 49). In line with this objection, we can argue a fortiori that, 
in the words of the famous playwright of Lajos Egri, ‘we only reveal our 
true selves in conflict [that is, if we are not in full control of our conflicting 
desires, of our own self ]’ (Cowgill, 2010, p. 77). Identifying and rejecting 
desires, therefore, can easily turn into excessive self-concern to the extent 
of pathological self-doubt and losing our (authentic) spontaneity (Wagner, 
2011, p. 38). And, without having trust in ourselves (particularly, by hav-
ing doubts about our capability to make decisions concerning desires), we 
lose ourselves as persons: because, how are we supposed to decide for our-
selves without self-trust, that is, if we do not trust ourselves that we can?5 
Furthermore, by being overtly concerned with our motivations for action, 
we might lose track of our primary concern, namely deliberating about 
what we should do. Basically, we forget to act. 
In Identification and Identity (1993), David Velleman compares 
Frankfurt’s notion of identification to the process of repression (in a 
Freudian sense), and he does so by invoking the famous example of the 
obsessional neurotic Rat Man. As a consequence of ‘the chronic co-
existence of love and hatred’ (1909, p. 239) both directed towards his 
father, Freud explains, the Rat Man’s personality is constantly divided into 
distinct loving and hating selves. However, what caused the Rat Man’s 
obsessional neurosis, was not so much his indecisiveness or ambivalence, 
but rather his response to it. By repressing his hatred and acknowledging 
only his love, the Rat Man allowed the two emotions ‘to survive unmixed 
hence to continue pulling the patient so violently in opposite directions’ 
(Velleman, 1993, p. 101). In a Frankfurtian reading of Freud’s case history 
of the Rat Man, Velleman contends that the Rat Man identifies with the 
love for his father and extrudes the hostility towards him as an ‘outlaw’. 
By doing so, Velleman suggests that what is true for Freud’s theory of 
repression, also applies to Frankfurt’s notion of identification, stating that 
‘[the] point of agreement between Freud and Frankfurt suggests that the 
Rat Man suffered, not from the disease of ambivalence, but from some-
thing like Frankfurt’s cure. What made him ill was his effort to dissociate 
himself from one of his emotions, which is just what Frankfurt prescribes 
for cases of ambivalence [namely] the ‘radical separation of (...) competing 
desires’’ (ibid., p. 102). Although Frankfurt is right to claim, in his reply 
to Velleman’s criticism in Contours of Agency (2002), that repression of a 
desire involves ‘secreting it in his unconscious’ (p. 125), whereas iden-
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tification does not require – or does not even allow for – such act, in 
which some desires are not let into the consciousness, Velleman, however, 
is still right in claiming that the practice of identification (as much as 
Freud’s theory of repression) involves a pathological defense mechanism, 
reflecting an unhealthy level of control over our ‘volitional life’.  
From what I have argued in this section it should be clear that iden-
tification is too – even unrealistically – strong a requirement to impose 
on a theory of personhood insofar as it seems to require of individuals 
that they are prepared at all times to investigate their volitional structure 
to the extent of obsessive self-control. In the next section, I will provide 
a second argument against Frankfurt’s account of identification, thereby 
drawing upon ideas from existential thought, such as authenticity.  
§1.2 Self-Deception and Inauthenticity 
There is still a deeper (and more important) truth behind the truism that ‘a 
person is often truly [himself ] when [he] fails at self-control’ (Schechtman, 
2005, p. 50). In the assignment of an ‘outlaw’ status to any desire the agent 
does not identify with, it becomes something external to him, or as Susan 
Wolf puts it, to the ‘real self ’ (1993, p. 35), whereas those desires that are 
endorsed by the agent as expressing his will, are internal to the self. How-
ever, according to Frankfurt, this does not necessarily mean that the desire 
that is external to his real preferences simply disappears from both action 
and thought (because the desire can still persist as an element of his experi-
ence), but that the conflict between his desires is moved to a different level: 
It [i.e., identification] eliminates the conflict within the person as to 
which of these desires he prefers to be his motive. The conflict between 
the desires is in this way transformed into a conflict between one of them 
[i.e., the desires] and the person who has identified himself with its rival 
[desire]. (1988b, p. 172, emphasis in original)
In Identification and Externality (1988a) Frankfurt further examines the 
notion of identification in connection with the distinction between inter-
nal and external desires using the following example: ‘suppose a person 
wants to compliment an acquaintance for some recent achievement, but 
that he also notices within himself a jealously spiteful desire to injure the 
man’ (pp. 66-67). By decisively identifying himself with the desire to com-
pliment his acquaintance and by excluding his jealous desire to injure the 
man from the order of candidates for satisfaction, Frankfurt argues, the 
person renders the first and second desire, respectively, internal and exter-
nal to himself, so that, in the end, the person does not want to injure the 
man (anymore).
But how, if at all, has the act of externalizing the desire made him 
‘not wanting’, that is to say, not having the desire anymore (given that 
Frankfurt in 1971 (p. 7) proposes to use the verbs ‘to want’ and ‘to desire’ 
interchangeably)? And, as has been previously noted, with the person at 
the same time still experiencing the desire, it becomes even more prob-
lematic. Frankfurt, however, according to whom the external desire is 
not a constitutive part of the person, argues that the person experiences 
the desire as an ‘external force’, as coming from outside of himself. But 
then, if Frankfurt is right in thinking that the external desire is some-
how not part of ‘the person’, of whom are they? (Should we assume 
the existence of free-floating desires?) The question is obviously rhe-
torical. Although a person might consciously repudiate a certain desire, 
it is far from being intuitively true to conclude that this desire is not 
his anymore: because, whether he wants it or not, it simply is. 
Suppose the person in Frankfurt’s example is, in fact, a high-school 
student who is jealous of the achievement of his fellow student-cum-
rival in being given a higher grade for a specific assignment. However, 
instead of following his jealous desire to injure this fellow student, 
he decides to identify with his desire to compliment him, thus want-
ing it to constitute his will. In this example, where merely the order 
in which the desires are textually introduced, is reversed compared 
to Frankfurt’s example, the decisive identification with his desire to 
compliment seems not so obvious anymore but rather unfounded. 
After all, why does the person have a desire to compliment his rival in 
the first place? But more importantly, given that he does have such a 
desire, why does he decide to identify with it? The intuitive response 
seems to be that the person wants to conceal his jealous desire (cf. 
Macbeth’s attempt to conceal his desire to kill Duncan, ‘Let not light 
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see my black and deep desires’, I, iv, 57-58), not only because acting 
on it would amount to acknowledging his ‘defeat’ (while coming across 
as a ‘bad loser’), but also because he wants to be perceived by others 
– and himself – as a good and socially respectable person. 
In this interpretation of Frankfurt’s example, the person seems to 
be more concerned with what he wants others to identify him with, 
than with what desires he wants to identify himself with. As a con-
sequence, what Frankfurt conceives as the ‘real self ’, is really but an 
ideal self-image or public persona, in a Jungian sense, that is to say, 
the (mask of ) personality an individual presents to the world. Simi-
larly, David Velleman argues in Identification and Identity (1993) 
that, in Frankfurt’s conception of identification, we mistake ‘the ideal 
implicit in our self-conception[s]’ (p. 100) for ourselves. At first glance, 
Frankfurt’s conception of identification may ring true intuitively as a 
fact of our experience, because we do indeed protect ourselves against 
unwanted desires and identify with those we want to be effective. A 
second look, however, reveals identification as a ‘common defensive 
fantasy’ (p. 109), because ‘we (…) engage not in self-definition but self-
deception [when] we identify with some of our motives by imagining 
ourselves as being those motives’ (ibid., emphasis in original). Accord-
ing to Velleman, when a person imagines that he is nothing but some 
of his motives, he identifies (and thereby reduces himself to) to a mere 
part of himself, hence – and in this sense he is like Jean-Paul Sartre’s 
waiter in Being and Nothingness (1956, p. 59) – he is playing at being a 
person. As a result, the agent does not only reject a part of his being a 
person (which, at least, should be conceived as such, intuitively), but 
he also identifies himself with the remaining part and believes that 
his being a person actually consists in that remaining part.  
In an attempt to preserve, at least in part, Frankfurt’s notion 
of identification, it might well be argued that identification is too 
strong a criterion to require of human personhood, so that it can-
not serve as a necessary condition for being a person, but that, at 
the same time, it is not necessarily incompatible with personhood. 
To do so, however, would be to entirely miss the point of the pre-
sent discussion, and this ultimately comes down to not being 
radical enough: identification cannot be compatible with person-
hood, because any agent who constitutes himself as a person through 
identification, does so, inauthentically and self-deceptively, or – to 
continue the analogy with Sartre’s waiter – by acting in bad faith.
§2 Satisfaction
In The Faintest Passion (1992) Frankfurt admits that his account of iden-
tification is indeed flawed – but – in the sense that it proves unsuccessful 
in warding off the threat of infinite regress. But, instead of rejecting it 
on the basis of its insufficiency, Frankfurt decides to preserve the ‘rather 
troublesome notion’ (p. 12) of identification (as he did earlier with 
respect to the notion of decisive commitment) and he proposes to do 
so by further clarifying its structure – as though his earlier analysis of 
identification did simply not allow for adequate understanding. In the 
previous section I argued that the notion of identification – if under-
stood correctly – is intrinsically problematic, so that its defense at most 
could only amount to preservation for the sake of mere preservation. 
Below I will claim that Frankfurt’s ‘revised’ notion of identification is 
also in conflict with his own philosophical presuppositions regarding the 
active nature of personhood.  
In The Faintest Passion Frankfurt takes a strikingly different approach 
in finding a basis for higher-order desires and volitions, than he did in 
his previous works. By introducing the concept of (identification as) 
‘satisfaction’, Frankfurt demonstrates again that there is no need to 
continue the ascent to higher orders, thereby supposedly solving the 
problem of infinite regress. However, this ‘again’ – forgive my naturally 
suspicious mind – makes me wonder at what costs. Before jumping to 
premature conclusions, let me consider what Frankfurt exactly under-
stands by ‘satisfaction’. On Frankfurt’s account, satisfaction is ‘a state 
of the entire psychic system – a state constituted just by the absence 
of any tendency or inclination to alter its condition’ (1992, p. 13). 
Let’s return to the example of Sharon. If we imagine Sharon, now fully 
recovered from her addiction, to be satisfied with the higher-order 
repudiation of her desire for marijuana, then we must imagine her as 
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wholly unconflicted about her desire not to give in to the temptation. 
In particular, this means that Sharon never questions the undesir-
ability of giving in, even in cases in which smoking marijuana might 
have proven helpful, for instance, in relieving her insomnia.  
But how could such a state possibly terminate the ascent to 
higher orders? To answer this, let me quote Frankfurt here at length:
To be satisfied with something does not require that a person have 
any particular belief about it, nor any particular feeling or attitude or 
intention. It does not require, for instance, that he regard it as satisfactory, 
or that he accede to it with approval, or that he intend[s] to leave it as it 
stands. There is nothing that needs to think, or to adopt, or to accept; it 
is not necessary for him to do anything at all. This is important, because 
it explains why there is no danger here of a problematic regress (1992, 
p. 13). 
So, according to Frankfurt, satisfaction does not require the agent to do 
anything at all. Because, if the agent did, that is, if he would have some 
deliberate psychic element such as a deliberate attitude or belief, as a con-
stituent of his being satisfied, his ‘satisfaction with respect to one matter 
would depend upon satisfaction with respect to another; satisfaction with 
respect to the second would depend upon satisfaction with respect to still 
a third; and so on, endlessly’ (ibid.). In other words, if satisfaction is to 
be preceded by some deliberate endorsement, why should there be no 
pre-endorsement endorsement? By the time of writing The Faintest Pas-
sion, Frankfurt must thus have realized that any active account of human 
personhood (such as the original version of his notion of identification) 
is susceptible to the problem of infinite regress. The alternative account, 
however, faces two very different but no less threatening problems.  
First, if the satisfied agent has no active interest in bringing about 
a change, why then should the agent still be considered a genuine 
person? After all, if he simply does not care about his psychic con-
dition (ibid.), then being satisfied seems to come very close to the 
indifference of the wanton. On Frankfurt’s account, however, ‘the 
essential non-occurrence [of psychic elements] is neither deliberately 
contrived nor wantonly unselfconscious’ (1992, pp. 13-14), because 
the absence of (deliberate) psychic elements is in itself reflective. 
But, how, if at all, can this absence be reflective, given that ‘[no] ade-
quate provision can be made for reflexivity without resorting to the 
notion of hierarchical ordering’ (1988b, p. 165, note 7)? Does the 
agent’s reflexivity not primarily manifest itself in the formation of 
higher-order desires? And if it does – and it does,6 how could this pos-
sibly amount to doing nothing at all (Rostbøll, 2004, p. 140)? 
 Second, the alternative to an active account of human personhood 
is necessarily passive in nature. In The Reasons of Love (2004) Frankfurt writes 
that autonomy, which should be considered as the core of human person-
hood, ‘is essentially a matter of whether we are active rather than passive in 
our motives and choices’ (p. 20, note 5, emphasis added), and earlier in Con-
cerning the Freedom and Limits of the Will (1998), he already concluded that 
‘the will is absolutely and perfectly active [so that] volition precludes passivity 
by its very nature’ (p. 79). But how then could such passivity with regard to 
one’s desires and motives, which is so peculiar to the notion of satisfaction, be 
justified from within the framework of Frankfurt’s own philosophy?  
According to Frankfurt, being satisfied with one’s condition does not 
entail that ‘no alteration of it would be acceptable’ (1992, p. 12). For me, 
the word ‘alteration’, in the sense used by Frankfurt, seems to imply that 
the person is a ‘passive bystander’ to the change in his psychic condition 
rather than the agent who accomplishes it. As a result, agency is reduced 
to something that merely happens to – or in – the agent. And, if we con-
sider that, according to Frankfurt, satisfaction with one’s own motivational 
state simply entails ‘the absence of […] resistance’ against it (regardless of 
whether or not it is the best possible condition available), then satisfaction 
may just as easily be understood in terms of resignation (in a Schopenhaue-
rian sense, as ‘the denial of the will’), depression or ennui. With regard to 
the latter two, Velleman argues that, in such cases, satisfaction is charac-
terized by ‘a lack of will […] under the weight of a psychic force that is 
usually regarded as pathological or alien’ (Velleman, 2009, p. 13). Being 
satisfied with one’s first-orders desires, therefore, does not necessarily con-
sist in taking them seriously as reasons for action, but might equally well 
arise from (a passive state of ) depression or boredom or laziness.  
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Concluding remarks 
In this essay I have explored Frankfurt’s attempt(s) to escape from the 
threat of infinite regress, which is so intrinsic to his hierarchical system of 
desire. I have concluded that his notion of identification and of satisfac-
tion failed to do so, not in the sense that they are not successful in halting 
the ascent to higher-order desires (because they are), but rather because of 
the high costs accompanying them with regard to human personhood. I 
have shown that by identifying with some desires and standing opposed 
to others (thereby rendering the latter external to the self ), we fragment 
ourselves (or, at least, representations of ourselves) in order to be a whole 
person; to be authentic persons, however, does not mean that we must 
radically exclude our unwanted desires, and consider them as somehow 
not being part of ourselves, because, of course (as our intuition dictates), 
they are. Further, I have demonstrated that satisfaction, as put in the words 
of Michael Bratman, is ‘a structural feature of the psychic system’ rather 
than a further desire in Frankfurt’s ‘psychic stew’ (2007, p. 23), thereby 
preventing it from becoming a mere infinite regression of desires about 
more desires, but, at the same time, making Frankfurt’s account of person-
hood vulnerable to becoming an account of volitional passivity. 
But why should we abhor the progressive ascent to higher-order 
desires (aside from ‘philosophical horror’) in the first place? In other 
words, why can we not stop fearing the regress and accept ‘volitional 
infinitism’ (cf. Peter Klein’s epistemic infinitism). The answer is simple: 
because ascending to yet higher levels would make us lose sense of what 
we really want and hence, make us lose sense of who we are.  
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Notes
1. Despite his ‘mindless indifference to the enterprise of evaluating his own desires and 
motives’ (1971, p. 13) the wanton is not to be considered as possessing no rational faculties 
(of a high order) at all, that is to say, as being ‘without mind’. A wanton is, or at least can 
be, rational. After all, in accordance with David Hume’s claim that reason in and of itself 
cannot motivate us to action (being a mere instrument without a finality of its own), it is 
not reason but the structure of the will that constitutes the essence of being a person in 
Frankfurt’s account of personhood.
2. By willingly accepting our motivational attitudes, ‘they are no longer merely items that 
happen to appear in a certain psychic history’, but they are transformed into ‘authentic 
expressions of ourselves’ (Frankfurt, 2006, p. 173).
3. For a more elaborate discussion of this argument, see Watson (1975, pp. 118-119).
4. Here, I specifically refer (as well as Frankfurt) to the sentence: ‘this commitment 
‘resounds’ throughout the potentially endless array of higher orders’ (1971, p. 16), by 
which Frankfurt suggests that ascending to higher orders is not necessary.
5. For the view that certain forms of self-appreciation (e.g., self-trust, self-esteem, self-
worth and self-respect) are necessary for autonomy and personhood, see, for instance, 
Govier (1993), Benson (1994) and Lehrer (1999).
6. See Frankfurt (1971, p. 7).
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